On the Burden (or Onus) of Proof

ETA: see below.

Some interesting thoughts on the so-called "onus [or burden] of proof" are out on the web right now, and I wanted to make a few comments, if I may:

I agree the "burden of proof" concept is maybe overstated in humanistic disciplines like religious studies.  I'd also agree that in areas without a consensus position, the burden is indeed simply on the person trying to make one case or another.  Having said that, I think there are meaningful ways in which a "burden of proof" can be employed.



If someone makes a case for A, and someone else tries to refute them, by making a case against A, or for "anti-A", let's say, then as long as the anti-A case is made in good faith, the burden is back on anyone trying to assert A.  They can't simply refer to the original case for A: they must now deal with the anti-A case.  Whereas the anti-A case no longer has a burden: they have made their good-faith case (whether right or wrong).  Thus the burden of proof really can shift from one position to another.

Keeping track of the "burden of proof" can be thought of as a way to keep track of whose turn it is in an informal debate.  (I had previously compared it to a game of tag, but that was imprecise.)  In a formal debate, for example, it is always one or another side's turn, and if one side has asserted a point, or at least an important point, it must generally be met (whether successfully or no).  That is all the burden of proof refers to.  Perhaps "proof" is indeed misleading here; it's really something more like the "burden of assertion", or perhaps "burden of demonstration".

ETA: I had previously used Mark Goodacre's "Case Against Q" as an example of an argument that no longer carried the burden of proof.  However, first of all, I had not really given due credit to Paul Foster's 2003 critique of it in NT 45 ("Is it possible to dispense with Q?"). Furthermore the cumulative arguments against Goodacre's thesis have been substantial over time, even though individual examples may have been limited in scope. (Goodacre himself of course provides a nice summary of responses to the case against Q.) And while it is true that Goodacre followed up his efforts (with Nicholas Perrin and others) in Questioning Q (2004; here is the RBL review), Goodacre (and the FH in general) is critiqued and Q defended with some vigor by Delbert Burkett in Rethinking the Gospel Sources, Volume 2: The Unity and Plurality of Q (with two RBL reviews). And yet Burkett's synoptic theory is something more than a simple two-source solution, so the situation is somewhat complex.  

The case against Q, on further reflection, seems like an interesting problem-case in the question of the burden of proof. Is the Two-Source Hypothesis the default position, or not? This may indicate that when there is real controversy--when there is no settled position among the academy (despite whatever the textbooks claim), the burden of proof lies on everyone. Thus, I have deleted the remainder of my original post, and leave it a question for the reader to ponder: where is the burden of proof in the debate on Q?